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My dissertation consists of four independent essays
analyzing how workers and firms adapt to changes in trade,
technology, and labor market institutions. Chapter 1 analyzes
the labor market effects of Germany’s 2005 Hartz IV reform,
which lowered the generosity of long-term unemployment
insurance (UI) available after a worker’s initial stream of
benefits runs out. Using administrative data on over 336,000
German UI claims, I exploit cross-worker heterogeneity
in the timing of Hartz IV’s effective onset to estimate how
long-term benefit cuts affect jobless durations, wages, and
job characteristics. Consistent with anticipatory behavior
among affected workers, the hazard rate of reemployment
starts rising several months before cuts bind, culminating in
a much larger “spike at UI exhaustion” under Hartz IV. My
estimates imply that the UI reform reduced the probability
of a one-year jobless spell by 12.4 percent, with employment gains driven by full-time jobs. Decomposing Hartz
IV’s effect on post-UI wages into wage losses from lower
reservation wages and offsetting wage gains from shorter
jobless spells, I find that reservation wages dominate, as
workers experiencing benefit cuts accept lower-paying jobs.
At the aggregate level, a partial equilibrium calculation suggests that Hartz IV’s causal effect on individual job finding
lowered Germany’s steady-state unemployment rate by 0.9
percentage points.
Chapter 2, coauthored with Daron Acemoglu, David
Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, argues that rising
Chinese import competition was a major force behind both
recent reductions in U.S. manufacturing employment and
weak overall U.S. job growth. Using an instrumental variables strategy based on Chinese exports to other high-income
countries, we show that manufacturing industries directly
exposed to Chinese import competition contract sharply relative to less-exposed industries. These direct impacts are augmented by input-output linkages and persist in local general
equilibrium. Our central estimates suggest import-induced
job losses over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.
Chapter 3, also coauthored with Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson, reassesses the conventional wisdom that
investments in information technology (IT) have dramatically boosted productivity while making workers redundant.
Examining IT usage in U.S. manufacturing, we find only
mixed evidence of faster productivity growth in IT-intensive
industries. Surprisingly, output in IT-intensive industries
falls relative to other manufacturing industries. Increases in
productivity, when detectable, reflect even faster declines in
employment.
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Chapter 4 exploits German high school reforms to estimate how sharp fluctuations in cohort size impact entry-level
labor markets. These reforms, which eliminated grade 13 at
upper-track high schools, led to an idiosyncratically timed
“double cohort” in each reforming state, as students graduated under both old and new rules. Consistent with the
small share of upper-track graduates who immediately enter
firm-based apprenticeships, new training contracts jump by
2 percent in double-cohort years. I find no clear evidence
that lower- and middle-track graduates are crowded out of
training positions, but the results are imprecise.

Chapter 1
The Duration and Wage Effects of LongTerm Unemployment Benefits: Evidence from
Germany’s Hartz IV Reform
Displaced workers often exhaust their unemployment
benefits before returning to work. Rather than ceasing benefit
payments entirely, many countries—including Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, and Spain—
rely on two-tiered systems of UI that combine generous
time-limited benefits with more modest benefits thereafter
(Esser et al. 2013). These long-term benefits loom especially
large for workers at the greatest risk of experiencing lengthy
jobless spells, which erode employment prospects, deplete
savings, and impose fiscal externalities through transfer payments and foregone tax revenue. Yet despite the widespread
use of two-tiered benefit schedules, and despite renewed
interest in long-term unemployment in the wake of the Great
Recession, little is known about how long-term UI benefits
affect jobless durations and post-UI wages.1
This paper analyzes the employment and wage effects of
Germany’s 2005 Hartz IV reform, a prominent and controversial measure that reduced long-term benefit levels for
both new and incumbent UI claimants. Germany historically
has had one of the most generous UI systems in the OECD,
including long-term benefits that may last indefinitely. By
the early 2000s, increasing UI caseloads—together with a
widespread sentiment that the safety net had become too
generous—created political pressure for a series of labor
market reforms, whose centerpiece was Hartz IV. On January
1, 2005, existing long-term UI recipients—who numbered
2.2 million and comprised 5.3 percent of the civilian labor
force on the eve of reform—were switched overnight to the
new, typically lower, postreform benefit level.2 Subsequent
inflows into long-term UI were subject to the new rules upon
exhausting their initial stream of short-term benefits. The
lack of grandfathering for incumbent claimants, together
with concurrent changes in labor market conditions and institutions, poses difficulties for some of the standard quasi-experimental methods that are used to evaluate UI reforms.3
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To overcome these challenges, I exploit cross-worker and
cross-cohort variation in the timing of Hartz IV’s effective
onset—based on individual heterogeneity in the potential
duration of short-term benefits—to identify the causal effects
of policy-induced benefit cuts. Short-term benefit duration is
determined by age and work history, and it ranges from mere
weeks to 22 months for the claimants in my sample. The basic intuition behind my research design is that the longer this
initial stream of benefits lasts, the more insulated a claimant
is from cuts to long-term benefits, because those cuts occur
later in her jobless spell.4
My research design can be understood as a generalization
of difference-in-differences. To fix ideas, consider a group
of workers entitled to 12 months of short-term benefits, who
enter UI in either 2001 or 2005. All else equal, the 2005 entrants should find jobs faster, since they face steeper benefit
cuts if they exhaust short-term benefits. Of course, many
other factors—such as labor demand, credit supply, or claimant characteristics—might have changed in these years. To
difference these out, now consider workers entitled to only
6 months of short-term benefits. As before, we would expect
the 2005 cohort to find jobs faster, but this tendency should
(and does) manifest more quickly for the 6-month group because they face the Hartz IV treatment earlier in their jobless
spells. As such, the difference-in-differences captures the
relative effect of Hartz IV on the more-exposed group. I generalize beyond this 2 x 2 example by including workers with
any possible short-term benefit duration, as well as intermediate cohorts that were in effect partly exposed to Hartz IV.5
I implement my research design using administrative
social security and UI records provided by Germany’s Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Starting from a 4.7
percent sample of newly unemployed workers, I construct an
estimation sample of over 336,000 new UI claims made by
prime-age displaced workers during 2001–2005. Formally,
I estimate flexible discrete-time proportional hazard models (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978), which allow me to track
changes in job-finding behavior as workers approach up to
two distinct step-downs in benefit level: the exhaustion of
short-term benefits, plus the incremental benefit cuts induced
by Hartz IV. These events coincide for workers who exhaust
short-term benefits after January 1, 2005, but they differ for
the many claimants who are “caught in midstream,” so that I
am able to separately identify their effects.
Even before Hartz IV, the job-finding hazard exhibited
a “spike at UI exhaustion”—a classic result dating back
to Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990). Above and
beyond this “main effect” of benefit exhaustion, however, job
finding rises markedly in the months leading up to reforminduced benefit cuts. The rising hazard rate—indicative of
forward-looking behavior on the part of job seekers—
culminates in a much larger exhaustion spike than was
evident before the reform. Mapping from hazard rates to survival functions, my preferred estimates imply that a worker
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subject to the postreform benefit schedule is 12.4 percent less
likely to experience a one-year jobless spell.6
Perhaps surprisingly, these employment gains are primarily driven by full-time jobs. Critics of Hartz IV allege
that draconian benefit cuts have compelled job seekers to
accept low-paying “minijobs,” a class of marginal, part-time
positions that grew markedly during the 2000s. But estimates
from a competing-risks version of my benchmark specification show that, if anything, fewer workers transition into
minijobs under Hartz IV.
I next extend my econometric model to analyze Hartz
IV’s effects on the wages workers receive upon being
reemployed. Prior work has noted that UI generosity has
offsetting effects on subsequent wages (Nekoei and Weber
2017). Benefit cuts may lower post-UI wages by depressing
reservation wages, as workers accept lower-paying jobs
when their outside option is worsened. Conversely, benefit
cuts may increase wages by shortening jobless durations,
thereby reducing any erosion of earnings capacity associated
with time out of work. Economists have found mixed evidence of how changes to short-term UI benefits affect wages,
with negative, positive, and many null results abounding in
the literature. I know of no prior studies that estimate the
wage effects of changes in long-term UI benefit levels.
To explore this question, I jointly estimate my hazard
model alongside a wage equation measuring how newly accepted wage offers vary with the time remaining until Hartz
IV binds. I show that workers accept lower-paying jobs as
they approach reform-induced benefit cuts, consistent with
falling reservation wages. To quantify these impacts, I adapt
expressions from Schmieder et al. (2016) to decompose the
net wage effect of Hartz IV into a reservation wage effect,
an offsetting duration effect, and a selection term capturing
selection into reemployment along a rich set of observable
dimensions. The reservation wage effect dominates: I conclude that UI reform reduced mean reemployment wages by
1.9 percent. As a corroborating piece of evidence, I show that
Hartz IV increased recalls to previous employers as well as
transitions to brand-new jobs. Insofar as recall offers amount
to options that workers choose (or decline) to exercise, the
rise in recalls confirms that workers derive lower reservation
utility from remaining jobless under the new UI regime.
The Hartz reforms, and Hartz IV in particular, have been
identified as possible drivers of an “employment miracle”
that saw Germany’s unemployment rate fall by 6.6 percentage points between December 2004 and December 2015. I
use my causal estimates of Hartz IV’s effects on individual
job finding to gauge what these partial equilibrium effects
imply for aggregate unemployment.7 Using a steady-state
formula that allows for duration dependence in job finding, I
calculate that the UI reform reduced Germany’s unemployment rate by 0.9 percentage points. Strikingly, almost all this
decrease stems from the long-term component of unemployment (spells of over 12 months), echoing Ljungqvist and
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Sargent’s (1998) claim that long-term UI benefits are a major
determinant of the incidence of long-term joblessness.

Chapter 2
Import Competition and the Great U.S.
Employment Sag of the 2000s
(coauthored with Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David
Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, published in the Journal of Labor
Economics, 2016, 34[S1 part 2]: S141–S198)
During the 1990s, the U.S. labor market exhibited a vigor
not seen in decades, with rising employment rates alongside rapid wage growth and low inflation. During the early
to mid-2000s, however, U.S. employment growth largely
stalled before turning sharply negative with the onset of
the Great Recession. In this paper, we explore a leading
candidate for the post-2000 “sag” in U.S. employment: the
dramatic rise in Chinese import penetration that occurred
during this period. We argue that surging Chinese imports—
driven by rapid Chinese productivity growth and by lower
institutional barriers to U.S.–China trade—have been a major
contributor to both job losses in U.S. manufacturing and,
through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium
mechanisms, weak overall U.S. job growth.
The key empirical challenge in gauging these impacts is
to isolate the portion of rising Chinese imports attributable
to supply-side Chinese factors.8 Adapting an instrumental
variables strategy introduced by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson
(2013), we instrument for U.S. imports from China using
Chinese exports to a set of eight other high-income countries.9 We then estimate two-stage-least-squares models of
changes in industry-level outcomes on changes in exposure
to Chinese imports, over the stacked periods 1991–1999 and
1999–2011. We measure industry-level outcomes using the
County Business Patterns and the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, produced by the National Bureau of
Economic Research and the U.S. Census Bureau’s Center for
Economic Studies (Becker et al. 2013).
We find that a 1 percentage point increase in Chinese
import penetration within a given manufacturing industry
reduces domestic industry employment by 1.3 percentage
points. Employment losses are pervasive across importcompeting sectors and robust to a battery of control strategies.10 Although our data do not report employment by education groups, steeper job losses among blue-collar production workers than among white-collar nonproduction workers
suggest that less-educated workers have been hardest hit by
import competition. Quantitatively, our estimates imply that
the direct effect of Chinese import competition can explain
the loss of 560,000 manufacturing jobs during 1999–2011.
Direct import substitution is only one of several channels by which import exposure may erode employment.
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Prior literature has highlighted the potential importance
of input-output linkages, whereby firms may be indirectly
impacted when their customers or suppliers are exposed to
trade shocks (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Long and Plosser 1983).
We use the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 1992 inputoutput tables to trace out how industry employment responds
to such indirect import exposure. We find robust evidence
that industries—both within and outside of manufacturing—shed employment when their customers are hard-hit by
trade competition.11 Accounting for these “upstream” effects,
whereby trade shocks propagate from buyers to suppliers,
increases our estimate of trade-induced job losses over 1999–
2011 to 985,000 in manufacturing and to 1.98 million in the
overall economy.
These effects may be either augmented or dampened
by other general equilibrium mechanisms. Earnings losses
due to fewer jobs and lower wages may depress aggregate
demand, resulting in additional employment declines. At the
same time, job losses in trade-exposed sectors may be partly
or even entirely offset by reallocation into nonexposed sectors, as reductions in wages and increases in the number of
job seekers encourage unscathed firms to post new vacancies
and expand their workforces. Refining an analysis pioneered
by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we gauge the net effect
of these several mechanisms by contrasting the evolution
of employment in local labor markets (“commuting zones”)
whose industry structures render them differentially exposed
to Chinese import competition. At the local level, we find
substantial job losses in trade-exposed industries with no
evidence of offsetting job growth in nonexposed industries,
suggesting that the job losses detected by our national
industry-level analysis persist in local general equilibrium.
On net, our local analysis points to trade-induced job losses
over 1999–2011 on the order of 2.4 million. In ongoing
work, we are using plant-level microdata from the U.S. Census Bureau to shed additional light on these general equilibrium channels.
While these numbers must be interpreted with caution,
our results suggest that Chinese import competition has been
an important contributor to weak U.S. job growth in the new
millennium.

Chapter 3
Return of the Solow Paradox? Information
Technology, Productivity, and Employment in
U.S. Manufacturing
(coauthored with Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn,
and Gordon Hanson, published in the American Economic
Review Papers & Proceedings, 2014, 104[5]: 394–399)
An influential “technological-discontinuity” paradigm,
powerfully articulated by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011),
3

argues that U.S. workplaces have been fundamentally
transformed by investments in information technology (IT).
This argument rests on two claims. First, in a departure from
Robert Solow’s famous observation that “you can see the
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”
(Solow 1987), proponents of this view assert that IT has by
now had pervasive positive effects on labor productivity.
Second, by enabling firms to expand output while shedding
employment, automation is giving rise to a smaller role for
workers in the modern workplace—as evidenced by recent
declines in the labor share of income (Karabarbounis and
Neiman 2014).
This paper reassesses these claims in the context of the
U.S. manufacturing sector. We make two simple points. First,
the evidence that IT investments are associated with rapid
productivity gains is weaker than might be supposed, at least
in manufacturing. Second, when detectable at all, IT-driven
growth in labor productivity appears to stem from declines
in output together with even steeper declines in employment.
This surprising pattern runs counter to our basic intuitions
about cost-reducing technological progress.
We use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database to track industry-level employment, output, and labor
productivity over the period 1980–2009. Following Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz, and Krueger
(1998), we begin by defining each industry’s “IT intensity” as
the ratio of IT capital investments to all capital investments.
We then estimate descriptive, event-study specifications to
examine how labor productivity has evolved over time in
IT-intensive industries, relative to less-intensive industries.
At first blush, IT-intensive industries have notched
impressive growth in labor productivity: a one-standarddeviation increase in IT intensity is associated with a 10-logpoint boost in productivity growth per decade. But this
IT-productivity nexus is driven almost entirely by the industries that produce IT. Excluding the computer and semiconductor sectors, and focusing instead on IT-using industries,
we find scant signs that greater IT intensity is associated
with faster growth in labor productivity.12 The IT-productivity relationship is sensitive to the choice of IT measure, and
regardless of measure we find no evidence of differential
productivity growth after 2000.13
Furthermore, if IT has indeed reduced production costs,
basic producer theory would predict that firms should
respond by expanding output (with ambiguous effects on
employment due to offsetting scale and substitution effects).
Empirically, however, IT-intensive industries have exhibited
relative declines in both output and employment since the
early 1990s. This fact pattern is difficult to square with a simple, neoclassical story in which technological advances are
making workers redundant.
Taken together, our findings serve as a cautionary note
that—at least within U.S. manufacturing—prior resolutions
of the “Solow paradox” may be incomplete.
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Chapter 4
Can Local Labor Markets Absorb Crowded
Cohorts? Evidence from German High School
Reforms
Every year, local labor markets must absorb new entering cohorts whose size and composition fluctuate over
time. An increase in cohort size (say, due to a baby boom)
heightens competition for jobs, university slots, and other
scarce resources (Bound and Turner 2007; Welch 1979), but
downward wage pressure and the ease of cherry-picking
good candidates in a buyer’s market gives firms incentives
to create new jobs. Analyzing how workers and firms adjust
to oversized cohorts can shed light on a host of questions
about job search and job creation. But studying the equilibrium impact of labor supply shifts is difficult because many
such shifts occur gradually over long periods of time, during
which technology, tastes, and institutions are unlikely to
remain constant.14
I overcome this challenge by exploiting sharp fluctuations
in local labor supply induced by German state-level high
school reforms. These reforms compressed the curriculum at
upper-track high schools (“gymnasia”), so that students graduate after grade 12 instead of grade 13.15 Between 2007 and
2016, each reforming state experienced one idiosyncratically
timed year in which two cohorts of gymnasium students
graduated simultaneously: the last thirteenth graders subject
to the old rules, plus the first twelfth graders subject to the
new ones. Although most upper-track graduates proceed
immediately to university, some instead enter Germany’s
famed firm-based apprenticeship system. As such, these
“double cohorts” should increase the supply of workers to
local apprentice markets.16
Using state-level aggregates published by Germany’s
Federal Statistical Office and other sources, I estimate
event-study specifications showing how education and labor
markets adapt to the double cohorts. I find that the number
of gymnasium graduates rises by roughly two-thirds in the
year of a double cohort. Total high school graduates rise by
22 percent.17 Next, I show that the number of newly signed
apprenticeship contracts increases by about 2 percent in a
double-cohort year. Though modest, this increase is precisely
estimated, and I can easily reject the null hypothesis that
short-run firm demand for new apprentices is perfectly inelastic: local employers absorb at least some of the increase
in labor supply by hiring more trainees than usual.18 Decomposing the increase in apprenticeships by high school degree
type reveals that the increase is driven by upper-track graduates. I find no clear evidence that lower- and middle-track
students not subject to the curricular reform are crowded out
of the apprenticeship market, but the effects are imprecise.
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In ongoing work with Simon Janssen and Markus Nagler,
I am exploring how the double cohorts affected job posting,
the skill content of new jobs, employer screening practices,
and worker-firm matching. Future work will also exploit
within-state variation in treatment intensity to more precisely
identify crowd-out effects and to study the spatial propagation of cohort shocks.

8.

Notes
1. An important exception is Kolsrud et al. (2017), who use a
regression-kink design to show that Swedish workers are more
responsive to changes in short-term UI benefit levels than to
comparable changes in long-term levels. I complement their
study by using a different design applied to a different policy
change in a different institutional setting and by analyzing
effects on a broader array of labor market outcomes.
2. Data limitations preclude exact calculation of the reforminduced change in household income experienced by each claimant. For this reason, my research design relies on the timing of
benefit cuts—which I can compute accurately—rather than their
magnitude. For context, however, I adapt the OECD Tax-Benefit
Model to simulate Germany’s entire tax-and-transfer system,
in an effort to gauge how Hartz IV impacted household balance
sheets. For my estimation sample of prime-age displaced workers, I estimate that the median claimant would incur a 5 percent
decline in postexhaustion household income, with one-quarter
of claimants facing declines of over 10 percent and a minority
obtaining higher income under the new regime.
3. Existing evaluations of Hartz IV have typically relied on
time-series identification (Nagl and Weber 2014) or on calibrated macroeconomic search-and-matching models (e.g.,
Bradley and Kuegler 2016; Krause and Uhlig 2012; Krebs and
Scheffel 2013; Launov and Wälde 2013).
4. Far-off cuts are discounted both because of pure time preference and because many claimants will find work before they
ever bind. Using a continuous-time job search model based
on Mortensen (1977), I show that cuts to long-term benefits
increase job finding and decrease reservation wages at all
jobless durations, and that these behavioral responses limit to
zero as cuts lie increasingly far in the future. For many common
functional forms, these effects dampen monotonically with time
remaining until the benefit cut.
5. Because incumbent claimants were not grandfathered in under
the old system, all pre-Hartz UI entrants would eventually
encounter Hartz IV if they remained unemployed in January
2005. Empirically, I track changes in job-finding hazards for
claimants whose Hartz IV benefit cuts bind in nine months or
fewer, relative to claimants for whom Hartz IV binds in 10
months or more. If workers begin responding even at such long
horizons, my estimates will yield conservative lower bounds on
Hartz IV’s true effects.
6. This core finding is robust to a host of control strategies, including a falsification exercise in which I alter the assumed date of
the Hartz IV reform. Furthermore, among incumbent pre-Hartz
IV claimants, responsiveness to Hartz IV is strongly correlated
with a proxy for the size of the benefit cut.
7. In general equilibrium, these direct impacts may be either offset
by congestion externalities or augmented by job creation. Using
both individual and local variation in Austrian UI benefit gen-
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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

erosity, Lalive et al. (2015) find that the “macro elasticity” of
job finding to changes in UI is about 20 percent smaller than the
micro elasticity. If the same is true here, my aggregate impacts
should be multiplied by four-fifths.
Consider two concerns. On the one hand, if rising import
penetration in a U.S. industry reflects booming domestic
demand, then regressions of industry employment growth on
import penetration will be biased upward. On the other hand, if
rising imports reflect adverse shocks to domestic input costs or
domestic TFP, then such regressions will be biased downward.
In related work, Pierce and Schott (2016) use an alternative
instrumental variables strategy based on nominal industry exposure to the U.S. conferral of Permanent Normal Trade Relations
to China in 2000–2001.
Our results are robust to controlling for differential employment
trends within one-digit manufacturing subsectors; industry
capital intensity and skill intensity; U.S. exports to China; and
other concerns. Reassuringly, a falsification exercise using
the periods 1971–1981 and 1981–1991—predating the rapid
growth in Chinese import penetration—shows no indication of
disemployment effects during this period.
Shocks to an industry’s suppliers have theoretically ambiguous
effects on that industry’s employment: firms whose suppliers
are subject to intense Chinese competition may benefit from
cheap foreign inputs, but they may also suffer from the loss
of domestic suppliers that often provide customized inputs.
Consistent with these offsetting mechanisms, our estimated
“downstream” effects are imprecise and unstable in sign.
In related work, Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon (2015) find
that recent productivity growth in manufacturing as a whole
is largely driven by IT-producing industries. Our contribution
is to show that, outside of these industries, there is no robust
relationship between IT intensity and productivity growth.
We also consider alternative measures of IT intensity, including
a set of 17 advanced technologies coded in the 1988 and 1993
Surveys of Manufacturing Technologies (Doms, Dunne, and
Troske 1997). The SMT measure provides stronger evidence
for an IT-productivity nexus, but the relationship again flattens
after 2000.
Even when sharp cohort shocks can be identified, they may be
endogenous to labor market conditions, or they may involve
increased labor supply among populations (such as immigrants
or welfare recipients) that differ considerably from the typical
cohort of new labor market entrants. My study avoids these
concerns.
The reforms sought to harmonize Germany’s education system
with the rest of Europe and to buttress public finances by
extending working lives. Double cohorts were an unintended
but unavoidable side-effect.
Several papers have analyzed the impact of these reforms on
educational attainment (e.g., Huebener and Marcus 2017; Marcus and Zambre 2016). To my knowledge, however, my paper
is the first to identify equilibrium impacts of the high school
reforms on the German labor market. Related work by Morin
(2015) studies how Ontario’s 2003 double cohort—which
resulted from a high school reform very similar to those in
Germany—impacted labor market outcomes among high school
graduates. Ontario’s shock decreased both youth employment
rates and youth wages, with wages falling by 5–9 percent two
years later.

5

17. About one-third of German secondary school students attend
gymnasia. The gymnasium graduation count rises less than
one-for-one because of grade repetition, grade-skipping, and
track-switching.
18. This result also confirms that local labor supply shocks have
disproportionate local effects. If newly minted graduates were
perfectly mobile, local supply gluts would simply diffuse
nationwide.
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